have studied the tax impact have assumed, at least implicitly, that public and private capital are positive substitutes in the Hicksian q-sense: increases in the private (public) capital stock reduce the marginal product of public (private) capital. Those who argue for ignoring the private risk premium have meanwhile presumed that the two types of capital are, on the margin, independent. While these may be reasonable approximations of reality in some cases, they exclude one important dimension of government investment. There are, in particular, many examples in which public and private capital actually complement each other. The construction of an improved highway system, for instance, often significantly increases the productivity of private industry in a specified region. An irrigation project will usually increase the agricultural yields of the areas it services. A subsidy to scientific research or education by the government can be considered investment that can raise the productivity of private capital. The list is virtually endless. The very reason that the government chooses to intervene in these cases lies in the external economies that such activities can create; the technical assumptions of the previous studies that preclude them are simply too restrictive.
In the present paper, therefore, we provide a general characterization of the socially optimal rate of return of government investment. In so doing, we shall acknowledge all of the possible interactions between public and private capital in any economy with a distorted capital market. The private sector will be presumed to invest up to the point at which the marginal return to such investment equals an arbitrary constant. This constant can reflect the corporate profits tax, a private risk premium, or any of the other distortions that might be influencing the private investment decision.
Section I specifies the model in which we shall be working, and the prescribed characterization is derived. It is found that if the requisite rate of return to private investment exceeds the pure rate of time preference, for example, then the optimal marginal return to government investment can be greater than, equal to, or less than the rate of time preference as public and private capital are substitutes, independent entities, or complements. The government's best strategy is thus technologically determined. When public and private capital are perfect substitutes, government is helpless to counterbalance a market distortion, and the efficiency of having all capital support equal returns dominates. Its effectiveness in correcting the market distortion, however, increases as the nature of the technological relationship between the two capital types moves from being imperfect substitutes into the realm of complementarity. In that realm, underinvestment by the private sector can be counterbalanced by public investment that increases the marginal product of private capital; returns to government capital are thus not only less than the return to private capital, but also less than the market rate of interest.
Two subsequent sections will apply the analysis. Section II explicitly incorporates the profits tax in the context of a model of a market economy. We shall utilize an aggregation process that allows the market to be reduced to the form outlined and analyzed in Section I, and apply the general results directly. Our conclusion will be quite familiar when the two types of capital are substitutes, but will be markedly different when they are independent or complementary.
Section III then simply notes the impact of differing rates of depreciation on our results.
I. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT UNDER DISTORTION
We shall be considering a model in which the life of any publicly provided project is T periods. The economy's intertemporal welfare function over the lifetime of such projects is then given by We assume that 4j > 0 and /ii < 0, for reflects whether public and private ca 0) or substitutes (GPG < 0). We furth capital can provide a constant flow of service throughout its lifetime without net investment; thus, (3a) Gt = Gt_1 + AGt-1, and (3b) Pt = Pt_1 + APt-1, where AGt and APt are investment during private capital, respectively. These investments are derived from that period's total output, so that (4) Ct= Yt -6Pt -AGt.
A final assumption produces the private investment decision: private individuals invest to the point where the marginal physical product of private capital equals a prescribed cutoff point kt.
Thus, (5) 4p(Pt, Gt) = kt; t = 1,... , T.
We are not yet concerned with the specific mechanism that determines this behavior. Instead, we simply observe the cutoff and presume that it emerges from decentralized decisions in the capital market. The kt parameters therefore reflect not only the extent of the distortions that exist in the market, but also the pure rate of time preference. The reader should note, however, that we have made the partial-equilibrium assumption, that the kt are independent of the level of government investment.
After specifying the initial levels of public and private capital (G1 and P1), we are left only with characterizing the optimal return to governmental investment. Maximizing (1) subject to (2) through (5) leads to the answer; the appropriate Lagrangean is
The appropriate first-order conditions require that3 Wet = Ut-At = 0,
Wpt = Atp(Pt, Gt) + Vt -vt-i + 77topp(Pt, Gt) = 0, and (7) WGt = Ati4(Pt, Gt) + wt -wt-1 + 17t4)PG(Pt, Gt) = 0.
As a result, A1t = Vt = wt = Ut, where Ut denotes aU/aCt, and (6) and (7) reduce to
Combining these by eliminating the shadow price and recalling (5),
we find that4 The optimal marginal return to gover therefore a weighted average of the marginal physical product of private capital (kt) and the rate of time preference (rt).
This condition is not new, as it stands, but its additional significance becomes clear when we observe that the sign and magnitude of the ratio (kPGlkPP) reflect the technological relationship between public and private capital. To see this point, we rewrite (10) as
Since Opp(t) < 0, the optimal marginal return to public be greater or less than rt, depending upon the signs of OpG -rt).
Consider, for example, the case in which imperfect risk spreading in the capital market leads to kt > rt for all t. A misallocation of resources results, and the economy provides too much current consumption at the expense of too little investment for the future. We are now asking how much power the government can muster optimally to counterbalance this underinvestment with its own investment decisions. In the extreme case where public and private capital are perfect substitutes (dPp = kPG), a unit increase in public investment simply replaces one unit of private investment; the government is powerless to correct the distortion. Equation (12) tells us that public investment should also return kt on the margin. If the two types of capital are independent (as in the additive production function assumed by Arrow and Lind5), then bPG = 0, and a unit increase in public capital has no effect on the marginal product of private investment. The government should then act as if the distortion in the capital market does not exist and continue to invest until a marginal 4. Notationally, we write O*G(O =-G (P*,G t), and (kPGhkPP)t 'kPG(Pt,Gt)hXpp(Pt,Gt).
Whenever it is unambiguous or immaterial, the time notation is dropped.
5. Arrow and Lind, op. cit.
return of rt is achieved. When public and private capital are complements, however, we finally observe that a unit increase in public investment can actually induce an expansion in private investment by increasing its marginal productivity. As a result, public investment becomes an effective vehicle with which to reduce the tendency of the private sector to underinvest. The optimal investment rule therefore calls for public investment to continue beyond the point where its marginal product equals the rate of time preference.
The opposite conclusions are drawn, quite naturally, when the market distortion provides extra incentives to private investment.
The intuition developed around the government's ability to counterbalance the effects of the distortion is, nonetheless, accurate. When there are no distortions, finally, kt = rt, and the second term of (12) disappears. The allocation problem is then a first-best question, and the optimal marginal return to G is simultaneously equal to the return to private capital and the rate of time preference. We can now summarize our findings in a proposition: 
II. AN APPLICATION: CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION6
We now consider the optimal public investment rule for an economy that taxes corporate income and issues government bonds to finance public projects. A constant proportional tax rate r is assumed to be applied to all corporate income, and we define the income of the ith firm in period t (irt) to be its gross output net of its w bill:
(13) vi -1 {iltp Gt) -wt1l, i =1...,n.
The labor employment and private capital stock of the ith firm in period t are given by lt and pt, respectively, while the wage and stock of government capital common to all firms are wt and Gt.
The analysis is simpler if we presume further that each firm is All three rules are familiar. Equation (15) allo current consumption and investment; it requires that investment proceed until the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the return to the riskless bonds. The second rule then allocates investment funds between private and public capital; the return to the last dollar invested in either should be equal after taxes are paid. In the notation of Section I, therefore, (18) kt cnrti(n -tnh Equation (17) records the conditions for t marginal value product of labor should precisely equal the wage rate.
The government must, of course, be fully cognizant of these reactions as it maximizes its intertemporal welfare function (equation (1)) by providing the optimal stream of public investment. The policy objective is to select the stream that will induce the correct stream of private investment in the light of (15), (16), and (17). We must, however, aggregate properly to be able to cast this problem in the analytical framework presented in the previous section.
Aggregate consumption in period t is simply given by the sum of equation (14) over the entire population; that is,
where Ct -1= c' is aggregate consumption, etc. In order to focus our analysis on the capital market, we presume now that the aggregate supply of labor (St) is not only inelastic, but also fixed over the planning horizon. If wt clears the labor market, we have that N Ht = Z {i(t) -wtS. The return to the riskless bonds in each period will again be the benchmark, and they are assumed to be exogenously fixed in each period. Notice that the demand for new bonds in the private sector (ABt) is determined by (15) and (16) once {rtI and 1GtI are given. The government's supply of new bonds (A\Dt ), however, is determined as the difference between tax revenues and the sum of the debt services (rTDt) and public investment (AGt); that is, (20) ADt = rtDt + AGt --rHt.
We are therefore overspecifying the bond market, sin guarantee that ABt = ADt at the given rt. To circumv culty, it is convenient to presume a perfectly elastic supp bonds denoted Ft that return rt. These foreign bonds excess demand for domestic government bonds. The pr of bonds are therefore simply the sum of the stocks o foreign bonds, and excess demand in the bond market is z given 1rt }. Notationally, We can now formalize the government's optimization problem;
it will maximize U(C1, ..., Cm) with respect to {Gt}t=1 and subject to equation (27),
7. The maximization of 2 N~fi~ltop' Gt) subject to il ' S and lipt < Pt requires the equality of marginal products of labor and private capital across all the firms, both of which are satisfied in our mixed economy due to (16) and (17). There are several points that should be made in passing. First of all, for a particular size of a, the sign of 'PG determines whether the optimal rate of return to public investment is greater or smaller than the return to the riskless bond; the rationale behind this result has been explained for a more general case in Section I. Second, given d1PG # 0, the divergence of I*(t) is larger, the larger the tax rate;
i.e., (01r = 1 + (I)PGG/4PP))(T/(1 -) ), and r/(1 --r) is an increasing function of -r.
The reader should also observe that the previously reported results are, in effect, special cases to which (28) can be applied. If, as has usually been assumed, r = 0.5 and bPG < 0, then (bPG/1PP)t > 0, Indeed, when P and G are perfect substitutes, the optimal return to public investment is 2rt. We concur with Baumol and the others, therefore, only when public and private capital are substitutes; in those cases, rt < cF>*(t) < Ort.
In all other cases, however, I*(t) < rt, with equality holdin when P and G are independent.
Finally, equation (28) provides a convenient, though somewhat artificial, framework in which to illustrate how the conclusions are reversed if the governmentally created distortions actually encourage private investment. Suppose that r is, in fact, a subsidy that is aimed at fostering extensive provision of a particular type of private capital. In that case (r/ (1 --r) ) is strictly negative, and the optimal return to government capital is less than rt if and only if P and G are substitutes.
III. THE IMPACT OF DEPRECIATION
We can easily extend our analysis to include the possibility that public and private capital may depreciate at different rates. We are motivated in this extension by the casual observation that some types of governmentally supplied infrastructures (e.g., roads, port facilities, hydroelectric projects, etc.) seem to be more durable than those typically provided by private capital stock. Consider, therefore, replacing equations (3) with (3a') Pt = (1 -Ap)Pt-1 + SPt-l, and (3b') Gt = (1 -Ag)Gt-l + AGt_1, where Ap and Aug represent depreciation rates for privat capital, respectively. While these rates are presumed const time, we do preserve a measure of generality by allowing th not equal Ag.
Following the analysis through, we can deduce that (29) I*(t) = (rt + A.g) + (4pG/I?pP)*(kt -(rt + Ap)).
If the rates of depreciation are equal, IG (t) reflects only the changes implied by the new public investment criteria. One small change is produced, however, when Ap # /ug. Suppose, for example, that government capital does depreciate more slowly, i.e., suppose that Ag falls below a given Ap. The optimal gross rate of return is then reduced regardless of the sign of APG. To the degree that public capital is more durable, its accumulation should therefore be encouraged. We should note, however, that we have captured only the obvious effect that increased durability simply increases the net return to capital for a given gross return. Rewriting (29), we see that (30) (+(t) -Ag) = rt + (dJpG/I4pp)*((k duplicates (12) when it is cast in terms of net returns. The conclusions that were drawn from the previous sections survive this complication entirely intact.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The government is, of course, typically faced with a multitude of potential projects whose services may be related by a complicated web of complementarities and substitutabilities. Each must therefore be appraised in the context of the interdependencies it creates with other existing and proposed projects. We can infer from our analysis, however, that it is equally important for the appraiser to take careful note of each project's complementarity or substitutability with privately provided capital. More specifically, when private investment is discouraged (encouraged) by distortions resulting from other policies, projects that would provide complementary services should be allowed lower (be required to achieve higher) rates of return than projects that would replace the private investments; the distortions are thereby partially undone. Regardless of these complications, durable projects should still be encouraged by allowing them lower gross returns. While developed countries provide public capital with varying degrees of interdependence and durability, these observations are perhaps most applicable to developing countries in which a large portion of public investment lies in the provision of infrastructures.
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